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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO		X		
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	NIO/USSR		X		
18	D/SOVA/DI		X		
19	NIO/EUR		X		
20	C/ACIS		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
22	ES		X		
	SUSPENSE				

Date

Remarks Yesterday you were provided fact sheets and Qs & As resulting from the Geneva Joint Communique. The NSC has just provided the attached Qs & As which should replace those you received yesterday. (The revision is based on an interagency clearance procedure.)

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Executive Registry
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Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York

Q: When will our Consulates be open?

A: -- We will be discussing specifics with the Soviets in the coming months.

-- We hope to move the issues forward as quickly as possible. Both sides have much to gain in cooperating in the timely and fair resolution of these administrative details.

-- In keeping with our policy of strict reciprocity, our consulates will open for business simultaneously.

Q: Have we settled on a final Consulate office building in Kiev? What will our facilities be like there?

A: -- A US inspection team visited Kiev the week of November 11 to consider potential properties for our consulate.

-- We are continuing to discuss administrative arrangements with the Soviets on this issue.

Q: Why did you choose to open the new consulate in Kiev?

A: -- The US now has posts in Moscow and Leningrad.

-- Kiev is the third most important city in the USSR in terms of cultural and economic accomplishments. It is

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a major manufacturing and scientific center.

-- It is visited by thousands of American tourists each year, including many members of the Ukrainian-American community.

Q: What will the consulate in Kiev do?

A: -- Once it has officially opened, the consulate in Kiev will provide the full range of consular services to Americans and Soviets within its consular district.

-- This includes representing the interests of Americans visiting the Ukraine and issuing visas to Soviets traveling to the US from the Ukraine.

-- In addition, the officers of the consulate will maintain contacts with government authorities in the Ukraine (the second most populous Soviet republic, with over fifty million inhabitants), keep the US government informed of developments there, and expand trade and cultural contacts with the region.

Q: Why are we reopening consulates now when we pulled out of Kiev following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Does our agreement to exchange consulates with the Soviets mean we no longer object to their presence in Afghanistan?

A: -- Our agreement on consulates does not signal a change in our policy toward the Soviet occupation of

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Afghanistan. We have repeatedly made clear to the Soviets our views on this subject and the need for a political settlement which includes the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

-- Our agreement on consulates reflects the President's desire to expand contacts between our two peoples.

-- An official U.S. presence in Kiev is an ideal opportunity to foster understanding between the United States and the citizens of an important cultural, commercial, and agricultural area of the Soviet Union.

Q: Why are we letting the Soviets bring more diplomats to the United States? Won't they all be spies?

A: -- Our agreement to open consulates is governed by strict reciprocity.

-- We will insist on strict equality in the size of the U.S. and Soviet consulate staffs.

-- We are fully committed to a policy of substantive equality with the Soviets. We are increasing the number of Americans employed at Embassy Moscow, and we expect the overall Soviet presence in the U.S. to decrease. Consulate staffing is only one part of that issue.

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Q: What will be the size of the consulate?

A: -I do not have specifics on the staffing at this time.

Q: Do we intend to have Soviets working for us in Kiev? Will we have any Sovie staff members?

A: -- I doubt it. However, we do not have specifics for you on this at this time.

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Q& and As on Fusion Project

Q: Aren't we giving away sensitive technology? Will such international cooperation compromise hard-won COCOM controls on technology transfer?

A: THE SOVIET UNION IS A WORLD LEADER IN FUSION AND OPERATES A FUSION REACTOR SIMILAR TO THE U.S. TOKAMAK FUSION TEST REACTOR (TFTR) AT PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY. TOKAMAK IS AN ACRONYM TAKEN FROM FOUR RUSSIAN WORDS: TOROID (MEANING CYLINDER OR DOUGHNUT, WHICH REPRESENTS THE CONFIGURATION OF THE HEART OF THE MACHINE), KAMERA (MEANING CHAMBER), MAGNIT (MEANING MAGNET), AND KATUSHKA (MEANING COIL). THIS SERVES TO REMIND US THAT THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT FOR THE TOKAMAK AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WAS TAKEN UP BY THE OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS IN FUSION.

COOPERATIVE FUSION RESEARCH WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RESULT IN THE TRANSFER OF COCOM CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. U.S. AND ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM WOULD BE GOVERNED BY STRICT ADHERENCE TO COCOM WITH NO EXCEPTIONS. THE "NO EXCEPTIONS" POLICY IS IMPORTANT TO SUSTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR CURRENT COOPERATIVE REGIME WITH THE ALLIES ON EXPORT CONTROLS.

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Q: If other Western countries don't join, will the U.S. and USSR proceed on a bilateral basis?

A: THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN TOGETHER TO DEVELOP MAGNETIC FUSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WILL WILL BE ATTRACTIVE, AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO PARTICIPATE. WE COULD, OF COURSE, EXTEND OUR CURRENT SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES ON FUSION RESEARCH WITH THE SOVIETS ALONE; HOWEVER, A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT IN THIS AREA WILL REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MAJOR PLAYERS IN FUSION RESEARCH.

Q: Why are you reducing the fusion budget in the U.S. and at the same time agreeing to this project?

A: THE ADMINISTRATION'S REDUCTION IN THE U.S. FUSION RESEARCH BUDGETS REFLECTS OUR LONG-TERM VIEW THAT THERE ARE MANY FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE SOLVED. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR FIRST PRIORITY HAS BEEN TO STRENGTHEN OUR BASIC RESEARCH BASE AND INCREASE AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO ANSWER THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS. A MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE VENTURE WILL PERMIT US TO POOL RESOURCES.

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Q: What is the status of the USSR magnetic fusion research program relative to the United States?

A: THE USSR HAS MAINTAINED A POSITION OF ROUGH SCIENTIFIC PARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. IN BASIC FUSION RESEARCH. THEY ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING FOUR MAJOR TOKAMAK DEVICES, EACH OF WHICH IS DESIGNED TO EXPLORE AN ASPECT OF THE FUSION PROCESS. THEY APPARENTLY ARE PLANNING A FIFTH SUCH DEVICE. THEY ALSO HAVE EXPERIMENTAL FUSION DEVICES BASED ON DIFFERENT PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES FROM THE TOKAMAK. SO THE SOVIETS HAVE A VERY BROAD FUSION RESEARCH PROGRAM COMPARABLE IN SCOPE TO OUR OWN.

Q: Will this research have relevance for SDI?

A: THE OBJECTIVES OF MAGNETIC FUSION RESEARCH AND SDI ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM DOES NOT INCLUDE A MAGNETIC FUSION COMPONENT.

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Q: What specific projects will this cooperative venture undertake?

A: IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO EVALUATE RESEARCH TO DATE IN ORDER TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON THE OPTIMUM NEXT STEP TOWARD THE PRACTICAL REALIZATION OF FUSION ENERGY. IT WILL ALSO TAKE TIME TO CONSULT ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AND TO WORK OUT AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF COSTS. THE INTEREST OF THE TWO LEADERS WILL ENSURE THAT THIS EVALUATION IS A PRIORITY EFFORT.

Q: What other countries qualify for participation?

A. WE CERTAINLY WANT PARTICIPATION FROM THE OTHER TECHNICALLY ADVANCED COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL FUSION RESEARCH PROGRAMS -- THE EC COUNTRIES AND JAPAN. OTHER COUNTRIES WITH RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE TO CONTRIBUTE MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE.

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Q: If you restrict sensitive technologies, won't you be tying one hand behind your back in what is already a very problematic technological engineering feat?

A: OUR FUSION ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM TO DATE HAS PROGRESSED STEADILY USING UNCLASSIFIED TECHNOLOGY. U.S. AND SOVIET SCIENTISTS ROUTINELY VISIT EACH OTHER'S LABORATORIES.

ANY MULTINATIONAL PROJECT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN EXISTING COCOM GUIDELINES TO PREVENT TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY WITH MILITARY POTENTIAL.

Q: Was this a U.S. or a Soviet initiative?

A: SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ IN OCTOBER. WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY STUDIED THE IDEA AND CONCLUDED IT HAS MERIT, AND HAVE MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS OF OUR OWN ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS A NATURAL PROGRESSION OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR AS WELL AS OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FUSION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

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Q: Won't this project divert funds from the Administration's SDI initiative?

A: NO. THE TWO ARE NOT RELATED. THE OBJECTIVES OF FUSION RESEARCH AND THE SDI ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, AND EACH DESERVES SUPPORT ON ITS OWN MERITS. MOREOVER, THE FUSION PROJECT REQUIRES A MUCH SMALLER COMMITMENT OF FUNDS, SO THERE IS LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR DIVERSION.

Q: It is reported that the DOD is against this proposal. Why? Has this been resolved satisfactorily?

A: ALL OF US BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS WHICH NEED EXPLORATION PRIOR TO A FINAL DECISION, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, COST SHARING AND PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF THE FEASIBILITY OF A JOINT PROJECT. WE WILL HAVE TO WITHHOLD JUDGMENT UNTIL THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN FULLY EXPLORED.

Q: Do you expect Eastern European countries and China to take part and, if so, what can they contribute?

A: WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING SHARING OF COSTS.

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Q: What has been achieved by the Fusion Exchange Agreement signed in 1973?

A: THE U.S. HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USSR SINCE 1973 UNDER THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS RENEWED IN 1983, CALLS FOR SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ON EXCHANGE PROJECTS OF INTERESTS. CURRENTLY THERE ARE TWELVE EXCHANGES OF TEAMS OF SCIENTISTS, SIX TO THE USSR FROM THE U.S. AND SIX VICE VERSA.

THE U.S. HAS BENEFITTED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE BREADTH OF THE SOVIET PROGRAM, AND IN PARTICULAR FROM ITS CONSIDERABLE THEORETICAL CAPABILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. FUSION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN FIELDS WHICH RECEIVE LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. PROGRAM. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE TWICE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED THE DIRECTION OF THE U.S. FUSION PROGRAM: (1) SOVIET EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON TOKOMAKS COMPLETELY CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE U.S. PROGRAM, AND (2) A SOVIET DEMONSTRATION EVENTUALLY LED TO THE TANDEM MIRROR PROGRAM AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY.

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Q's and A's on the President's Exchanges Initiatives

Q: What are the benefits from these exchange initiatives?

A: -- Societies everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad, deep, and free as possible. By encouraging exchanges of American and Soviet citizens in the arts, education, science, sports, and other fields we hope to expose increasingly large and influential segments of Soviet society to our values, intentions, and goals.

-- Additionally, we hope to learn more about Soviet practices and goals in various fields as well as build relationships with Soviet academic, scientific, and intellectual leaders. There are also very real benefits that come when exchanges of information and access to the other country's institutions reduce unwarranted suspicions and build confidence in our ability to discuss and resolve mutual problems.

Q: Don't we already have exchanges agreements? Why is the President offering new exchanges initiatives now?

A: -- The President's initiative on exchanges is intended to build on those already in place. We have had formal cultural and educational exchanges with the Soviet Union for more than twenty-five years. These exchanges have been valuable in keeping lines of communication open between various segments of our societies.

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-- However, it is important to recognize that the gulf that separates our two societies is too wide for us to rely solely on traditional programs. It is necessary to bring larger numbers of American and Soviet citizens together in a healthy, balanced give-and-take on ideas, values, and shared experiences. This can help break down barriers which separate us, open up Soviet society to new ideas, and prepare future generations to be better able to solve the difficult problems which divide our two countries.

Q: What about reciprocity? Don't the Soviets usually come out the winners in such exchanges?

A: -- Exchanges are exactly what the word implies -- give and take. Both countries have a wealth of cultural, artistic, academic, sports and entertainment resources which should be shared. Both sides benefit.

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-- The exchanges will be fully reciprocal. Both sides must receive equivalent benefits and carry out equal responsibilities under any exchanges agreement.

Q. Won't the KGB exploit expanded exchanges to place more of its agents in the U.S.?

A. -- Under current practice, the U.S. Government carefully reviews each proposed exchangee and program. If it is determined that an individual ~~alien's~~ presence in the United States would be contrary to U.S. national security, a visa would not be issued in that case.

-- These are only two of the many steps that are presently taken to ensure U.S. national security interests in exchange programs with the Soviet Union. We believe that these measures are consonant with our desire to learn from Soviet exchangees and to expose them to American education, values, and our society at large.

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Q: Why take the risk of letting Soviets in at all? Why not keep them all out and eliminate all risks of espionage?

A: -- All countries have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible. The Soviet practice of sealing their people off and filtering and controlling contacts and the flow of information is a primary problem which led the President to call for more exchanges between our countries.

-- United States citizens rightfully believe that their society is among the most free, most prosperous, and the most conducive to creativity and free expression. There is much to gain from exposing large numbers of Soviet citizens to our way of life.

-- At the same time we will continue to protect our national security by carefully screening each applicant for a visa and taking all appropriate steps to ensure that known espionage agents are not permitted to enter the United States.

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Q: Just what steps does the government take to identify and keep out spies? What happens when one is discovered in an exchange program already in the U.S.?

A: -- Every individual from the Soviet Union who applies for a visa to enter the United States is individually screened to determine if he or she is a bona fide visitor. If not, the visa would be denied under an appropriate section of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This screening is an interagency effort which begins at the Embassy where the person applies for the visa, and continues among all concerned USG agencies in Washington.

-- If any alien temporarily in the United States is discovered to be out of status -- that is pursuing activities other than those for which he or she applied for the visa -- that individual would be subject to proceedings initiated by INS. If those activities were illegal, the Justice Department would make an investigation to determine if charges should be filed.

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Q: Doesn't this increase the danger that Soviets will steal or otherwise obtain our technology?

A: -- There are a number of laws and mechanisms to reduce the risk of undesirable technology transfer in our exchanges programs. These exist because we take the threat of illegal and undesirable technology transfer seriously and believe we must take all possible steps to counter it.

-- We do not believe the answer is to shut the door completely to exchanges. The benefits of these exchanges to us, in scientific, academic, political and social terms, are too great to forego. The solution is complex requiring careful screening of both the types of programs we open to exchanges and the actual individuals we invite to participate.

Q: Don't these exchanges initiatives imply a return to business as usual with the Soviets when they continue to ignore U.S. requests on human rights issues?

A: -- As the President has said, human rights are important to our overall relationship and are being addressed. The exchanges initiatives does not mean the U.S. cares any less about the fate of individuals subjected to human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, nor will we ignore them. However,

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-- In protesting actions which suppress basic human rights we must not take out our indignation on those not responsible. That is why the President feels we should broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better on an individual basis.

-- Cooperation between the US and USSR over many years in scientific and technical fields such as atomic energy, environmental protection, housing and construction, and many others, has yielded many scientific benefits. These benefits arise from combining resources, drawing on each other's expertise or gaining access to unique institutions or geographical areas.

-- Furthermore, we will use the contacts opened by exchanges to continue vigorously advocating our human rights concerns. The professional contacts which grow out of scientific exchanges, for example, can serve as a mechanism to assert the interest of the American scientific community in the cases of dissident Soviet scientists.

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Q & As on the NOPAC Air Safety Implementation Accord

Q: When will this agreement come into force?

A. -- The Memorandum of Understanding came into force through an exchange of diplomatic notes on October 8 of this year. It will take several more months for the communication circuit to be set up and become operational, however.

Q. Does this agreement mean the Soviet Union has agreed there will be no more Korean Airliner shootdowns?

A. -- It doesn't. But it does reduce the danger of a repetition of such a tragedy, and that was what we were aiming for.

In our view, using the new mechanisms we have agreed on is a very practical way of reducing the changes of recurrence, and that is why we are pleased that agreement has been reached on the implementation procedures. The basic objective in these talks was enhancing air safety.

Q. If an airliner strayed off a NOPAC route toward Soviet territory, would the Soviet Union get in touch with us under this agreement?

A. -- This agreement establishes the mechanisms and means for doing that, and the Soviet Union has committed itself to get in touch with us when an unidentified civil aircraft enters one of their flight information regions.

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Q. But if Soviet law provides for shooting down an airplane, and no one is changing their legal obligations, what is this agreement worth?

A. --

current international law obliges all countries to assist a civil aircraft to proceed safely without shooting it down. What we were aiming for was new mechanisms and commitments to use them which would make it more likely that those obligations under current law are honored in the future. We have achieved that aim. In addition, the mechanism we have agreed on will provide some means to assist aircrews before they are in violation of Soviet territorial airspace.

Q. What type of situations does the procedures document cover?

A. -- It provides that in the event of an emergency situation in-flight that requires an immediate landing, the Soviet Area Control Center will provide assistance to the aircraft up to and including a landing on Soviet territory if it cannot reach U.S. or Japanese territory.

-- It also delineates what each control center should do when it has information, or reason to suspect, that an aircraft has strayed into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union.

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-- For example, if either the Anchorage or Tokyo Centers is aware that an aircraft under their control has inadvertantly deviated into a Soviet Flight Information Region and is out of communication with Tokyo or Anchorage, they will advise the Khabarovsk Center of that fact. The Soviets will then attempt to relay information to the aircraft to return it to course.

-- Conversely, if the Khabarovsk Center has reason to believe that an unidentified aircraft detected in its airspace has strayed from one of the Northern Pacific routes, it will communicate with Tokyo or Anchorage and provide the information it has on the aircraft's location, altitude, and course.

-- With this information, either the Tokyo or Anchorage Center will attempt to provide all pertinent information on the aircraft to Khabarovsk.

-- Other procedures spelled out in the agreement provide guidance for handling an aircraft that has been hijacked and is heading into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union, or one which has suffered a loss of communications.

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Qs and As on a New U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement

Q: How is this agreement better than the previous one? What have we learned?

A: -- While the previous exchanges agreement with the USSR was a good one, we believe that more could be done. The previous agreement opened channels of communications, expanded our knowledge of the Soviet people and the Soviet system, and increased Soviet understanding of the United States and its people. The essential elements of the old agreement have been included in the new.

-- In addition, we have strengthened the portion on academic exchanges, making more specific the obligations of the two sides. Language has also been added assuring greater balance and representation in the selection of U.S. performing artists for travel to the Soviet Union.

Q: If we have this agreement, why did the President raise other exchange programs separately?

A: -- Negotiations on this agreement began in the summer of 1984. The agreement covers a number of specific, traditional programs, some of which were continued in the absence of an official agreement, such as academic exchanges and the reciprocal distribution of America Illustrated and Soviet Life. The President asked that

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these negotiations come to fruition when ready. The President also wanted to reach out to the Soviet people with new, bold initiatives, to promote openness, better communications, and more direct contacts between our peoples.

Q: Why have you suddenly rediscovered the value of exchanges with the Soviet Union after breaking them off after Afghanistan?

A: -- The President never lost sight of the value of exchanges. In his January 16, 1984 statement on the value of genuine people-to-people contacts, he talked about the views and aspirations of average people in both countries. Again, on June 27, 1984, he emphasized the need to establish better contacts between our governments and peoples. He also announced that we were beginning negotiations on a new exchanges agreement and called for the reinvigoration of our other bilateral exchanges.

-- Private exchanges of students, athletes, musicians, and entertainers have continued but at a reduced pace throughout this period.

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Q: Was this agreement hurried through so that we would have something to sign in Geneva, something to deflect attention from arms control?

A: -- No. Negotiations on this agreement began in the summer of 1984. They were conducted for more than a year in a professional and business-like manner on both sides. The agreement was concluded when we reached a text that was satisfactory to both sides.

-- Obviously, we are pleased to have had the opportunity to sign the agreement in Geneva. There was no desire on our part to "rush" this important agreement, but we also saw no reason why it could not be completed during this meeting.

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Q: Why do we need an exchanges agreement at all?

A: -- We do not have, as a rule, cultural or educational exchanges agreements with other countries. It is our preference to let America's own rich, vibrant cultural and academic world interact freely with other societies without governmental involvement. In the case of the Soviet Union, the USG finds it advantageous to have an official bilateral exchanges agreement to ensure reciprocity. It is our experience that with regard to Soviet exchanges, most American academic and other private institutions also find USG involvement advantageous.

Q: Does the absence of an official exchanges agreement mean there have been no exchanges over the last 5 years?

A: -- No. There have been numerous and various private exchanges between the U.S. and USSR. The USG encourages these people-to-people contacts. The exchanges agreement is in no way restrictive and places no limits on private sector initiatives.

-- In addition, certain programs which fell under the old agreement, and which are part of the new one, continued in force in the absence of an agreement. Academic exchanges continued, although at reduced

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levels, and the reciprocal exchange of publications -- USIA's America Illustrated and the USSR's Soviet Life -- was also maintained.

Q: What are the major features of this agreement?

A: -- There are four major parts of the agreement:

- (1) reciprocal traveling thematic exhibitions in each country staffed by language-qualified guides;
- (2) academic and educational exchanges;
- (3) performing arts exchanges, groups and individuals; and
- (4) the exchange of America Illustrated and Soviet Life.

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Nov 22 1985 21 PM '85

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MESSAGE NO. 023 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES 26

FROM W. ROBERT PEARSON [redacted] 456-2225 WEST WING

(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION [redacted] Q's & A's — Interagency ANA

NSC STAFF CLEARED 11/22/85 NSC NUMBER: 9295

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	NICK PLATT	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	
	WILLIAM B. STAPLES	ACDA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	
DEFENSE	COL DAVID BROWN	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	
JCS	CAPT JOHN BITOFF		
CIA	[redacted]	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	
ENERGY	WILLIAM VITALE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	
TREASURY	SHERRIE COOKSLEY	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	

REMARKS

You received yesterday fact sheets on the items listed as attachments to the Geneva joint statement. We have worked the Q's/A's which accompanied these fact-sheets for interagency clearance. ~~These Qs and As have also~~ We are sending these Q's and A's now for your guidance as appropriate.

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